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Abstract
We consider the effect on performance of very large controlling shareholders, who are
mostly organized in voting blocks and business groups, in a sample of Belgian listed
firms from 1991 to 2006. Since the shape of the relation between ownership and firm
value is a controversial issue in corporate finance, we use semiparametric local-linear
kernel-based panel models. These models allow us not to impose a priori functional
restrictions on the relation between ownership and performance. Our semiparametric
analysis shows that the effect on performance varies depending on the size of ownership
stakes and that there are departures from linearity, especially in family firms. Our
results suggest that this non-linearity in family firms is related to whether or not the
CEO is a family member.
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1 Introduction
Most of the literature that examines the impact of ownership structure on firm performance
investigates the issue of managerial ownership in corporations with diffuse ownership. Giv-
ing managers a stake in the firm in the form of ownership is generally thought to align the
interests of managers and dispersed shareholders, and to resolve the conflict of interest be-
tween them (see e.g. Berle and Means 1932, Jensen and Meckling 1976). A related issue is
the effect of large shareholders. On one hand, they have the incentives to oversee the man-
agers in order to maximize firm value and help overcome the agency problem (see Shleifer
and Vishny 1986, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). On the other hand, there might also be costs
associated with the presence of large shareholders. For instance, Stulz (1988) provides a
theoretical framework, in which the relation between managerial ownership and firm value
is concave. He shows that, beyond a certain point, managerial ownership has a negative
effect on firm value, because managers have the ability to entrench themselves and block
value-enhancing takeovers.
While there is no agreement on the direction of the relation between ownership and
performance in the theoretical literature, there is also a controversy in empirical studies
regarding its shape. For instance, using a piecewise linear specification, Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988) and Cho (1998) find a non-monotonic relation between managerial own-
ership and performance, while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report an inverse W-shaped
relation, Cui and Mak (2002) find a W-shaped relation, McConnell and Servaes (1990) use
a quadratic specification, Short and Keasey (1999) use a cubic specification, and Davies,
Hillier, and McColgan (2005) a quintic form.1 Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) summarize
the controversy about the shape of the ownership performance relation in a graph, which
we reproduce in Figure 1.
In this paper we analyze the impact of ownership concentration on performance in a
panel of Belgian listed firms, observed from 1991 to 2006 using semiparametric kernel-based
local-linear pooled, random and fixed effects models, which can accommodate any type of
functional form. We find that the effect of large shareholder ownership on firm perfor-
1See also Chen, Ho, Lee, and Shrestha (2004), who discuss the use of non-linear specifications in corporate
finance studies.
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mance is non-monotonic and that there are non-linearities captured by the nonparametric
estimation. Our paper makes a number of contributions.
First, we use an innovative econometric technique, which has been developed recently
and is not part of the standard toolbox in financial econometrics or empirical finance. We
show how kernel-based local-linear semiparametric pooled and random (see e.g. Wang, Car-
roll, and Lin 2005), as well as fixed effects estimation (see Henderson, Carroll, and Li 2008)
can be performed in a unified framework. A semiparametric method allows us not to im-
pose any a priori functional restrictions on the effect of ownership on firm performance,
and including fixed effects allows us to deal with potential endogeneity of ownership con-
centration, our main variable of interest. Using nonparametric techniques is particulary
relevant in this literature, since the shape of the relation between ownership and perfor-
mance is so controversial. Indeed, almost every study seems to find a different shape, or
impose a different functional form on the relation between ownership and performance. To
the best of our knowledge the only two papers that use a semiparametric approach to ex-
plore ownership and performance are Gorton and Schmid (2000) and Florackis, Kostakis,
and Ozkan (2009). Gorton and Schmid (2000) fail to find evidence of non-linearities in
two separate cross-sections of German firms in 1975 and 1986, but their results are based
on fairly small sample sizes. More recently, Florackis, Kostakis, and Ozkan (2009) use a
semiparametric pooled estimation for a sample of UK firms and they find a non-monotonic
association between executive ownership and performance with an alignment effect up to
15 percent ownership. Beyond that level they identify several possible turning points, but
the effect is no longer statistically significant. While in panel data it is common practice
to control for firm heterogeneity by including firm fixed effects, these papers fail to address
this issue. It is well-known in empirical research that results with or without fixed effects
(either pooled or with random effects) can be radically different. It is not rare to see sign
reversals or significant results based on pooled regressions that become insignificant, once
fixed effects are included. The trouble is that whenever results differ across estimation
methodology, this means that parameters estimated from pooled or random effect are in-
consistent, which means that the coefficients are subject to positive or negative biases of
arbitrary magnitude. Including a fixed effect allows to control for potentially endogenous
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unobserved time-invariant cross-sectional heterogeneity, a problem that typically plagues
economic and financial panel data.
Our second contribution is to provide evidence on very high levels of ownership con-
centration not considered before in the literature. We carefully construct a unique and
detailed database of Belgian listed firms and the composition of their shareholdings for a
period of sixteen years, from 1991 to 2006. The first quartile of share ownership of the
leading shareholder is about 40 percent of voting rights, and the average shareholder holds
about 54 percent. This very high concentration is rather uncommon and it is a unique
Belgian feature. While Belgium is an example of the continental European tradition of
ownership concentration, there are specific legal mechanisms, such as the recognition of
voting blocks and the prevalence of business groups, that exacerbate this concentration.
Voting blocks are formal agreements amongst shareholders that are explicitly allowed by
law. In this regard, Belgium offers a unique laboratory to examine the impact of powerful
controlling shareholders, grouped in voting coalitions, on firm performance. In addition to
the high level of ownership concentration, the Belgian corporate system is characterized
by a fairly small and illiquid stock market with few listed firms, and the predominance of
holding companies with a close link to families.2
Our third contribution is that we depart from the mainstream literature on ownership
and performance, which is based on U.S. firms and considers the share ownership of insiders
who are usually managers and members of the board. These papers aim to test the hypoth-
esis of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of ownership and control and investigate
whether managerial ownership provides an incentive for managers to maximize firm value
and consequently reduce agency problems between them and dispersed shareholders. In-
stead, we focus on ownership concentration, because even though managerial ownership is
present, the Belgian context is one of high levels of ownership concentration in the hands of
a very small number of shareholders, who are mostly voting blocks and/or business groups.
Thus the agency problem is not between managers and shareholders, but between large
2Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) document levels of ownership concentration in China that are comparable
to the ones in Belgium. However, in 75% of the firms in China, the largest shareholder is the State or one
of its affiliates, and thus one can expect the motivations and objectives of shareholders as well as potential
conflicts of interest to differ greatly between China and Belgium, especially given the stark differences in
the economic tradition and corporate systems of the two countries.
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controlling shareholders and the smaller ones. Our paper differs also from most studies on
ownership concentration, which are usually interested in the divergence between ownership
and control and the deviation from one-share one-vote through devices such as multiple class
shares, pyramids, and/or cross-shareholdings (see for instance La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
and Shleifer 1999, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002, Bennedsen
and Meisner Nielsen 2010). Our paper is related to Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008), who
investigate the role of large shareholders on corporate policy choices and performance in a
sample of U.S. firms with blockholders. However, the size of blocks in their sample, which
averages 9.6 percent, is much smaller than the average 54 percent in our Belgian listed
firms.
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on the performance of family firms. In terms of
the prevalence of family firms, Belgium is in line with the continental European tradition.
Many studies analyze family firms for different countries and most of the results seem
to support the view that family firms perform better than the others (see for instance,
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) for two different samples of
U.S. firms, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) for a sample of French firms, and Maury (2006) for
13 Western European countries). The main argument in favor of the superior performance
of family firms is that families are stable long-term investors who are there for several
generations (see e.g. James 1999, Anderson and Reeb 2003). However, having a family
as a controlling shareholder can also lead to poor performance if the family chooses to
take advantage of its position, exchange profits for private benefits, and forgo profitable
projects, see for instance Demsetz (1983). A number of studies report this adverse effect
of ownership on performance in family firms, see for instance Bennedsen, Meisner Nielsen,
Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) for Danish firms, Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung
(2000) for a sample of Canadian firms, and De Angelo and De Angelo (2000) for a case
study of the Times Mirror company.
Finally, we also explore the effect of ownership on performance for firms related to
coordination centers and firms without such a link. Coordination centers were created in
Belgium in 1982 to attract multinationals to relocate their financial operations in Belgium
and to favor employment. These centers provide a large range of financial services to the
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sole benefit of their group members on a roughly free tax basis. They were prohibited in
2008 (some continue to operate until 31 December 2010 under certain conditions), but were
operating during our sample period and constitute a main characteristic of the Belgian
corporate system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data, and Section
3 is dedicated to the description of the large controlling shareholders. In Section 4 we
present the estimation framework, Section 5 discusses the results, Section 6 performs some
robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
In this section, we discuss our sample selection, the construction of our ownership data
from a number of different sources, a discussion of our identification of family firms, as well
as the sources we rely on for the other variables.
2.1 Sample selection
Our sample consists of all Belgian listed firms except those in the financial sector, such as
banks, insurance companies, common investment funds, companies active in or related to
financial intermediation, as well as real estate firms. We also exclude some companies in
coal mining and steel production that were involved in a long liquidation process but were
still listed and had incomplete data. We limit ourselves to firms with available balance
sheet data and a declaration of ownership to the Banking Commission, therefore, out of
an initial total sample of 243 firms we end up with an unbalanced panel of 194 firms with
1676 firm year observations between 1991 and 2006.
2.2 Ownership data
In Belgium, the disclosure law of 1989 makes notifications to the Banking Commission of
share ownership in listed firms mandatory for all shareholdings of at least 5 percent of voting
rights. This threshold could be as low as 3 percent if the firm writes this into its statutes, see
Appendix A for more details. Hence, ownership information is public, and it is featured in
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a number of databases: (1) BDPart at the Documentation and Statistics Department of the
Brussels Stock Exchange records the current ownership of listed firms, but unfortunately it
does not keep historical data; (2) the “Centrale des Bilans” database at the National Bank
of Belgium (NBB) provides ownership data, but it only keeps track of Belgian shareholders;
(3) “Belfirst” from Bureau Van Dijk starts recording ownership positions of listed firms in
1997, but this data is not of sufficient quality and it requires what amounts to an almost
manual cleanup.3 Due to these limitations with available databases, in order to carry out
this study, we had to construct our own ownership data manually. We start in 1991, since
there was a grace period of two years for some firms after the adoption of the law in 1989,
but by the end of 1991 all firms were required to report their shareholdings. Our sample
ends in 2006, since after 2006, the Belgian law regarding ownership notifications thresholds
was modified. To collect ownership data, we rely on several sources: (1) annual reports of
listed firms; (2) notifications available in the Documentation and Statistics Department of
the Brussels Stock Exchange; and (3) yearly publications of the shareholdings of Belgian
listed firms from the “Research and Strategy Department Equity Research” at ING bank
(previously BBL). We proceed as follows. First, we use the firms’ annual reports to collect
ownership, as this provides us directly with year-end ownership stakes. Second, in case of
missing annual reports, we resort to the hardcopy notifications from the Documentation
and Statistics Department of the Brussels Stock Exchange, which record every change
in ownership composition. This is more detailed, but less practical for the purpose of
constructing year-end positions.
2.3 Family firms
In addition to the whole sample, we estimate separate models for family and non-family
firms. Introducing such a distinction makes results potentially sensitive to the criteria used
to recognize family firms. In this regard, thanks to the Belgian disclosure law, we have
available the declarations of control of shareholders of listed firms to the Banking Commis-
sion, which clearly state whether a shareholder is a family group. The declarations even
3For instance, for some firm year observations, shareholders appear twice with different shareholdings.
In other instances shareholders disappear for a year and then reappear, and sometimes, after verification,
it turned out that the data had not been updated.
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identify family firms when they are controlled indirectly via a pyramid-scheme. Further-
more, many Belgian firms have their origins in the 19th century, and the matters of family
succession and wealth of Belgian dynasties are widely documented in the Belgian press,
which leaves us with another source to compare the results of our classification to (see e.g.
Coenjaerts, Buron, Charlot, and Halloy 2007). Thus our identification of family firms is
close to the one of Sraer and Thesmar (2007), who define a family-firm as one where the
founder or the heir is in control. However, our classification differs from Faccio and Lang
(2002) (F&L thereafter) who consider as family firm any firm whose controlling shareholder
is either a family (including an individual) or an unlisted company for a sample of 13 West-
ern European countries (including Belgium). More recently Franks, Mayer, Volpin, and
Wagner (2012) trace the ultimate ownership of private as well as listed companies through
ownership chains involving both listed and private companies in France, Germany, Italy
and the UK. They find several misclassifications of family firms by F&L for these countries.
A comparison of our family firm data, for Belgium, with the one of F&L reveals that for 8
firms that are family-firms according to F&L, we find no such link (false positives), while
we find a link to a family for 7 firms that are not family-firms according to F&L.
2.4 Other data
Following the literature on ownership and performance (see e.g. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
1988, McConnell and Servaes 1990, Short and Keasey 1999, Davies, Hillier, and McColgan
2005), we control for firm size, proxied by log of total assets, leverage, which we measure as
short and long term debt, investment, proxied by capital expenditures, R&D as a proxy for
investment opportunities, and investment in financial fixed assets, which is an important
part of Belgian firms’ investments. All these variables are weighted by total assets. Our
dependent variable is firm performance, which we measure as market-to-book ratio (as a
proxy for Tobin’s q). All the accounting data we need to construct these variables come
from two sources. For the 1991-1996 period we rely on the NBB’s “Centrale des Bilans”
database4 and for the 1997-2006 period, we use the “Belfirst” database of Bureau Van
4We use two CD-ROMs with the data from NBB: the first one, edited in 1995, contains annual accounts
for 1991, 1992, and 1993; the second one, edited in 1998, contains annual accounts for 1994, 1995, and 1996.
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Dijk5. In order to merge data from all these different source, we identify firms by their
VAT code.6 Finally, in order to compute market-to-book value, we collect year-end market
capitalization of listed firms from the Brussels Stock Exchange.
Table 1 defines our variables, while Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the different
variables we use in our analysis. On average, market-to-book value is about 1.15 for the
whole sample. Family firms have the highest average market-to-book value with 1.41 against
1.02 for non-family firms, with a statistically significant difference, while it is 1.12 and 1.16
for firms related to coordination centers and those without such a link, but the difference
is not significant. There is no statistically significant difference between family, and non-
family firms in terms of size, debts, investment in financial fixed assets, capital expenditures,
or R&D. Firms affiliated to a coordination center are significantly larger in terms of size,
short and long term debt, investment in financial fixed assets, than those without such a
link, while in terms of capital expenditures there is no statistically significant difference.
3 Large controlling shareholders
In the literature there are two opposing views on the outcome of ownership concentration
on firm value. One line of reasoning is that ownership concentration is a way to provide
shareholders with an incentive to monitor managers, which will result in a positive associa-
tion between ownership concentration and firm value. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provide a
theoretical justification for this argument, which they confirm in their survey of corporate
governance in 1997, where they state that large shareholders have the ability to “address
the agency problem in that they have both a general interest in profit maximization, and
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected” (Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), p.754). This positive effect of ownership concentration on firm value is con-
firmed for instance in Gorton and Schmid (2000) for a sample of German firms, in Xu and
Wang (1999) for Chinese firms or in Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) for a sample of Indian firms.
However, there is an alternative theory, which holds that ownership concentration might
5We use the year end CD-ROMs for every year from 1997 to 2006.
6In order to identify listed firms from the Brussels Stock Exchange, we look up their names in the
“Me´mento des Valeurs” to obtain their VAT codes, which allows us to uniquely identify them on NBB or
“Belfirst” sources. This avoids any possible confusion between firms with similar names.
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be a way of diverting resources. This view is also expressed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
p.759: “As ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control of
the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of
control that are not shared by minority shareholders.” Similarly, Claessens, Djankov, Fan,
and Lang (2002) argue that the valuation discount prompted by large entrenched owners
in East Asian countries is not due to actions related to blocking value-enhancing takeovers,
but is related instead to extraction of private benefits and direct expropriation through
transfer of financial wealth to affiliated firms. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2000) refer to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling share-
holders as “tunneling”. They point out that this expropriation can take different forms,
such as the transfer by the controlling shareholder of resources from the firm to his own
benefit through self-dealing transactions; transfer pricing advantageous to the controlling
shareholder; excessive executive compensation; loan guarantees to the controlling share-
holder; expropriation of corporate opportunities, and so on. Denis and McConnell (2003)
argue that the evidence from around the world indicates that the relation between owner-
ship structure and firm performance varies both by country and by block holder identity
but most often ownership concentration has a positive effect on firm value.
Usually a distinction is made between Anglo-Saxon corporations with diffused own-
ership, and continental European ones where ownership is concentrated in the hands of
a small number of shareholders (see e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer 1999,
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000, Becht and Mayer 2001, Franks and
Mayer 1995). While the level of concentration is much lower than in continental Europe,
even in the U.S. and the U.K. large share stakes and dominant shareholders are not that
uncommon (see e.g. Holderness and Sheehan 1988, Zwiebel 1995, Leech 2002, Demsetz 1983,
Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988, Holderness 2003, Cronqvist
and Fahlenbrach 2008, Holderness 2009). The literature generally considers that ownership
is concentrated if the largest shareholder holds more than 10 percent of voting rights. Some-
times that threshold is set at 20 percent (see for instance studies such as La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, and Shleifer 1999, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000, Faccio and Lang 2002). In
this paper we are far above these figures, since the average shareholder holds about 54
9
percent of voting rights.
In Belgian listed firms, there exist three types of shareholders: (1) individual share-
holders (physical or moral persons); (2) collections of shareholders gathered in a business
group or (3) collections of shareholders gathered in a voting block. Individual shareholders,
either moral or physical persons, hold direct stakes in the firm. Business group blocks are
the stakes of companies that are part of a business group, which consists of a set of legally
distinct entities under the control of a large corporate owner. While business groups are
subject to consolidation rules under Belgian law, the legal independence of their affiliates
preserves their limited liability in case of bankruptcy. A voting block is a coalition of share-
holders, who officially (and publicly) declare that they act in concert. This is a formal
agreement, allowed by Belgian law, between a number of shareholders, either individuals
and/or business groups. These agreements are typically entered into with the objective of
gaining greater control. The share ownership of the largest shareholders is already very
high without taking into account voting blocks, but voting blocks make the concentration
of ownership even higher.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the nature and size of the main groups of shareholder by two-
digit NACE code. In the whole sample, of all shareholders that are part of a voting block, in
terms of shareholder year observations, more than 48.6 percent are financial intermediaries,
and this number increases to more than half, if one adds the 2.3 percent of shareholders
whose activity is auxiliary to financial intermediation. Another large group is physical
persons, who make up 14.8 percent of all shareholder year observations. Institutional
investors, such as insurance and pension funds make up less than 4 percent of all shareholder
year observations. Real estate companies also represent a significant group of shareholders,
with 3.93 percent of the total. The rest of the shareholders are companies in various fields
of services or industrial sectors. On average financial intermediaries have fairly large stakes
(17 percent). The patterns are very similar for shareholders that are not part of any voting
blocks. In family firms there is a slightly stronger prevalence of shareholders that are
physical persons and of real estate companies and fewer financial intermediaries, relative to
non-family firms (still in terms of shareholder year observations). Note that the companies
that are shareholders of family firms are in turn controlled by the family. For instance,
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in many cases, financial intermediaries that are shareholders of family firms correspond to
holding companies, controlled by the family.
We define a number of ownership variables, that reflect the different possible ways
of aggregating shareholdings. We start out from the variable Single shareholder, which
considers all declared shareholders in a firm individually. This means that there can be more
than one in each firm at each point in time, as long as their holdings are above the threshold
that triggers a declaration to the Banking Commission. Next, we build the variable Largest
shareholder without voting blocks, which takes the largest of all single shareholders for each
firm and each year. Finally, to build the variable Largest shareholder (with voting blocks),
we take the share ownership of the largest shareholder, after aggregating up the shares of
all shareholders in the same business group and/or voting block and treating them as if
they were one shareholder. We refer to Table 1 for a definition of the variables.
We assess ownership concentration in two ways: first we analyze the percentage of
share ownership, and next we look at the number of declared shareholders in a given firm.
In terms of the number of shareholders, Figure 2 shows that there are very few different
shareholders in the same firm. For instance, in about 15 percent of firm-year observations,
there is only one single declared shareholder and in about 62 percent there are between one
and four shareholders in the same firm. There is only one percent of firm-year observations
with more than 18 shareholders and a maximum of 26. While the number of shareholders
is small to begin with, these shareholders generally join together and form voting blocks.
When we consider voting blocks, the number of shareholders decreases even more. Column
(1) of Table 3, Panel B shows that in almost 30 percent of firm-year observations there
exists only one voting block, in 1.97 percent there are two, and in 0.36 there are three.
Column (2) of Table 3, Panel B shows that there is a single business group in almost 37
percent of firm-year observations, while two business groups locate in the same firm in only
9 percent of observations. Finally, it is only in less than 1 percent of observations, that
there are as many as 4 or 5 business groups. These business groups can also join together
and form voting blocks. According to Column (3) of Table 3, Panel B, in almost 8 percent
of firm-year observations one business group is a member of a voting block and in almost
7 percent there are between 2 and 4 business groups that form voting blocks.
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There are also interesting patterns in terms of percentage share ownership. Table 2
shows that the distribution of all shareholders taken individually without making any dis-
tinction between them has an average of about 14 percent. However, this average jumps to
43 percent, when we consider only the largest shareholder in the firm but without taking
into account voting blocks or business groups formations. These figures are even higher
when we further take into account voting blocks, and the average increases to around 54
percent.
The distribution of the large controlling shareholders confirms that shareholders form
voting blocks in order to gain more control. This is obvious if we compare Column (a) of
Figure 3, where we take into account all individual share holdings in the firm, to Columns
(b), in which we consider only the first largest shareholders for the whole sample in the
first row, as well as for the subsamples of family, non-family, coordination center, and non-
coordination center firms in subsequent rows. The histograms in Column (c) of Figure 3
show the distribution of large controlling shareholders when we further take into account
business groups and voting blocks. There are concave bumps in the distribution of share
ownership, which correspond to thresholds that are meaningful in terms of control. The
histograms in Column (c) shows significant concave bumps in the 50-55 percent range,
which correspond to absolute majority. There are also bumps in the 25-30 percent range,
which could be due to the Belgian legislation on tax reduction on dividends. Indeed,
according to Belgian law when a shareholder reaches 25 percent of voting rights she/he
benefits from an exemption of taxes on dividends. This applies exclusively to shareholders
that are companies, and not to physical persons. The last bumps are at 75 percent, which
is the threshold required by Belgian law to modify the statutes of the firm. A comparison of
the histograms in Column (b) with those of Column (c) reveals that while the distribution
of share ownership is different, bumps are found at the same thresholds, but with different
magnitudes. The histograms also reveal that there are very few observation below 10 or 15
percent and above 85 or 90 percent, depending on the sample we consider, and one should
keep this in mind when interpreting the nonparametric results below.
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4 Estimation framework
We estimate a nonparametric panel, because this gives us the flexibility not to impose
any a priori functional form on the variables of interest, while simple econometric models
assume functional forms that are either linear, piecewise linear with arbitrary cut-offs,
or sometimes quadratic or of even higher order. While economic theory often predicts
the sign of the relation between variables, it rarely provides predictions about its shape.
The nonparametric methodology allows us to be agnostic about the functional form of the
relation between the variables of interest. This is of particular relevance for ownership and
performance, where there is little agreement about the functional form (see e.g. Demsetz
and Villalonga 2001).
While nonparametric techniques have a long history, nonparametric panel methods have
been developed more recently, and they have spurred recent interest in the econometric
literature. For instance, using semiparametric fixed effects estimation, Kan and Lee (2012)
study the effect of weight on wages, controlling for height, Zhou and Li (2011) analyze the
effect of development on inequality, while Chen and Dong (2012) use such a model in the
context of trade. Yet, the idea of carrying out nonparametric and semiparametric estimation
in the context of panel is not new. Early references include Ullah and Roy (1998), who
discuss various estimators. In the case of the random effect, Henderson and Ullah (2005) put
forward feasible versions of some of the nonparametric random effects estimators considered
in Ullah and Roy (1998), but they do not consider the semiparametric case. In this paper,
we use a local linear kernel-based approach.
We run our parametric and semiparametric estimation not only in pooled panel, which
could deliver biased estimates, but also with random and fixed effects. The random effect
assumption allows to deal with firm heterogeneity, while the fixed effects model allows us to
deal with endogeneity by controlling for time-invariant cross-sectional heterogeneity, that
could be correlated with the regressors.
For the sake of comparison, we first use parametric panel data models of the impact of
ownership concentration on firm performance and other control variables. The basic pooled
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OLS model is:
Yit = µ0 + Zitθ +Xitβ + ǫit, t = 1, . . . , Ti, and i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where Yit is performance, Zit is shareholdings of the largest controlling shareholders, Xit
includes other control variables, such as firm size, short and long term debt, investment
in financial fixed assets, capital expenditures, R&D, and a set of time dummies, µ0 is the
intercept, θ and β are coefficients, ǫit is an error term, and we have an unbalanced panel
with Ti time series observations for firm i.
We also estimate both fixed and random effects models, which correspond to different
assumptions on the error term, ǫit = µi + εit, where εit is assumed to be homoscedastic
and uncorrelated over time. Under the random effects assumption, µi is a time invariant
firm-specific zero mean homoscedastic random term, which is independent of εit. In the
fixed effect case, the model changes to:
Yit = µi + Zitθ +Xitβ + εit, (2)
where µ0 is omitted, as it is subsumed by the non-stochastic firm-specific intercepts µi.
We are interested in the following partially linear panel specification:
Yit = θ(Zit) +Xitβ + µi + ǫit. (3)
where θ(z) is now a potentially non-linear mean function, and its first derivative, ∂θ(z)
∂z
can be interpreted like a parameter: if θ(z) is linear, ∂θ(z)
∂z
is constant, and we are back
in the parametric case. Our specification is a semiparametric one, where the effect of
ownership Zit is nonparametric, while control variables Xit enter linearly. This avoids the
well-known curse of dimensionality, and focuses attention on the object of interest, which is
the potentially non-linear relation between ownership and performance. Like in the linear
case, we entertain the semiparametric model (3) under the same three assumptions about
ǫit = µi + εit: pooled with µi = 0, random effects with µi random and independent and
fixed, where µi is a firm-specific constant. For the pooled and random effects estimation,
we use the estimation procedure proposed by Wang, Carroll, and Lin (2005) for the efficient
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estimation of a semiparametric regression with cluster level random effects. For the fixed
effects estimation we rely on Henderson, Carroll, and Li (2008). For more details about the
estimation procedure, we refer to Appendix B.
5 Results
Table 4 contains results for the full sample, and then separately for family and non-family
firms, while Table 5 shows results when we split the sample between firms related to a
coordination center and firms without such a link. In each case, we estimate both parametric
and semiparametric versions of the pooled, fixed and random effects models. Panel A of
the tables shows the parametric estimation, and Panel B shows the linear part of the
semiparametric models.
We first analyze parametric results. In most cases a Hausman test favors the fixed
effects model, which points to the inconsistency of the random effects estimator.7 We focus
on results with fixed effects, as they are consistent under any assumption on the firm-
specific effect. The parametric results show a positive effect of ownership concentration
on firm performance in the full sample. This effect is positive and strongly significant for
non-family firms while it is negative but insignificant for family firms. This suggests that
there is an alignment effect for firms not related to families, while there is apparently no
effect of ownership concentration on performance for family firms.
While the effect of ownership of the largest shareholder on firm performance is positive
and of similar magnitude for firms with and without a link to a coordination center, this
effect is only marginally significant for firms affiliated to a coordination center. Thus it
seems that the overall positive effect is driven mainly by non-family firms, and firms not
affiliated to a coordination center.
Next we examine the semiparametric results, which deliver a more nuanced picture with
important departures from linearity, especially for family firms. Before starting to interpret
the nonparametric results, we reiterate that in many cases, as can be seen from Figure 3,
there are only very few observations at both extremes of the ownership distribution, and
7The exception is the case of coordination centers, where ownership concentration is only marginally
significant (at 10%).
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thus results below 10 or 15 and above 85 or 90 percent of ownership are likely to be driven
by a very small number of points, and one should therefore abstain from reading too much
into the shape of the curve in those areas (see also Florackis, Kostakis, and Ozkan 2009).
Figure 4 shows the nonparametric effect of ownership on performance for the whole sample
for the pooled, random and fixed effects estimations. The shape is quite different from one
estimation to the other. The pooled estimation shows an increase in performance below 20
percent, followed by small concave bumps at 20 and 40 percent, in a relation that is mostly
increasing until 40 percent and slightly decreasing thereafter. With random effects, we get
an increase below 20 percent, and then a relatively flat curve.
We focus our attention on Figure 4c with fixed effects estimation, since fixed effects
control for potentially endogenous time-invariant unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. The
effect of ownership on performance is positive until about 75 or 80 percent and very slightly
concave, with a less marked increase after 50 percent and eventually a small decrease
between about 75 and 90 percent. These turning points occur at or around meaningful
control thresholds in Belgian law. As mentioned in Section 3, according to Belgian law, a
shareholder whose ownership reaches the threshold of 25 percent of voting rights gets an
exemption of taxes on dividends. Thus, after 25 percent, the dominant shareholder has an
incentive to act in such a way as to maximize firm value, in order to reap the benefits of
the reduced taxation on their dividends.8 This contributes to the alignment of his interests
with those of the dispersed shareholders. This positive effect at high levels of ownership
is consistent with what Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find in U.S. firms and is also
in line with the literature that suggests that with higher levels of ownership, shareholders
have the incentives to control managers (see for instance Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This
seems to change when ownership reaches about 75 percent, which is the legal threshold
after which a shareholder can change the legal statutes of the firm. Thus, after 75 percent,
8This tax exemption on dividends applies exclusively to individual shareholders (not voting blocks) that
are moral, but not physical persons, and whose holdings exceed the threshold of 25% of a firm for more than
one consecutive year. We have found that in 62.5% cases when the largest shareholder is in the 25%-27.5%
range, the largest individual shareholder is a moral person who also holds more than 25% of the shares of
the company, while this fraction is 46% for the 27.5%-30% range, and it increases to 89% for the 30%-32.5%
range. Out of all firm year observations where the largest owner holds more than 25% of the shares of the
company, the tax exemption applies to 89% of them. Thus, while the tax exemption argument does not
systematically apply to all largest shareholders in the bracket of ownership above 25%, it still applies to a
very large majority of them.
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it is not entirely clear what the intentions of the shareholder are with the firm. He could be
engaging in mergers and acquisition, or prepare to delist the firm, and this could explain the
decrease in performance after that threshold. However, as we mention above, one should be
careful when drawing conclusions, since at these extremes there are only few observations.
We now examine the results when we distinguish between family and non-family firms.
Figures 5a and 5b clearly show the difference in the relation between ownership and perfor-
mance between the two groups, which confirms previous findings in the literature about the
specificity of family firms. Since it applies in the same way to all firms, an argument based
exclusively on the legal control thresholds in Belgium cannot explain differences between
both groups of firms.
It appears that for family firms, ownership has a positive effect on performance between
15 and 30 percent. From 30 to 40 percent, there seems to be a plateau, followed by a
negative effect of ownership on performance, which starts out very weak between 30 and
45 percent and progressively becomes stronger. The curve eventually seems to increase
again or stabilize at around 75 percent, and then decreases again for even higher levels
of ownership concentration. The fact that the effect is first positive for small values of
ownership concentration and then negative also explains why a linear model struggles to
deliver a significant parameter. Indeed, one could think of the linear model as delivering an
“average slope” over the whole range of values of ownership concentration, and therefore the
positive and negative slopes will tend to cancel each other out. This biases the coefficient
towards zero and adversely affects its significance. Figure 5b shows a very different picture
for non-family firms, with an overall increasing effect of ownership on performance up to
75 percent, and a number of tiny concave bumps around 20, 40, and 60 percent. Overall
the shape is concave with a maximum reached at 75 percent, and a decrease between 75
and 85 percent of ownership, when the dominant shareholder has the power to modify the
statutes of the firm. This slightly concave shape is qualitatively similar to the one found in
U.S. firms for managerial ownership by McConnell and Servaes (1990), with a maximum
around 49% in 1976 and 38% in 1986.
The finding in Figure 5a is compatible with several explanations. First, this is com-
patible with the existence of an entrenchment effect, which could explain the declining
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performance when ownership concentration is above 40 percent, and which becomes more
pronounced, once the shareholder reaches absolute majority. It appears that with as little
as 30 or 40 percent stakes in the firm, the shareholders of family firms are already powerful
enough to extract rents and have a negative impact on firm value. Such an entrenchment
effect has been found for a sample of continental European firms by Bennedsen and Meis-
ner Nielsen (2010), as well as and in Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000). This does not,
however, explain the non-monotonicity in Figure 5a.
An alternative explanation is that families holding high stakes in a company are likely to
hold all or a large part of their wealth invested in it, which results in under-diversification,
and therefore high levels of risk aversion (see e.g. Demsetz and Lehn 1985). It is thus likely
that the declining performance that we observe at high levels of ownership concentration
results from the fact that dominant risk-averse family shareholders prefer to forego riskier
investment opportunities, which eventually lowers firm performance. Since in principle the
entrenchment explanation could apply in the same way to all firms, regardless of whether
they are owned by families or not, the strong difference between family and non-family firms
makes the risk-aversion explanation for the ownership performance pattern we observe in
family firms more plausible.
A possible alternative explanation for the difference between family and non-family
firms is provided by the Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) model, in which a retiring
founder/manager of a family firm has to decide jointly about the fraction of the company’s
ownership he wants to retain, as well as whether to hire a professional manager or to leave
management to his heirs. A professional manager is assumed to possess better skill than
the heir. One of the model’s predictions is that families with a lower level of ownership
in the firm hire a professional manager, while families with higher level of ownership keep
the management inside the family, for instance because of the amenity potential of the
firm. Thus one possible explanation of the upward slope we observe in our nonparametric
estimation for family firms with ownership between 15 and 30 percent could be that, like in
the Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) model, family firms with lower levels of ownership
are run by professionals who are better managers, while above a certain threshold (in our
case about 30 percent) firms tend to be run by family members, which results in lower
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performance, because they lack the skill of a professional manager. Non-family firms on
the other hand, exhibit a slightly nonlinear but overall upward trending pattern which
is consistent with Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003), since non-family firms are all
managed by professionals, resulting in better performance.
We were able to find suggestive evidence that supports the Burkart, Panunzi, and
Shleifer (2003) explanation by attempting to identify the family firms whose CEO is a
family member. While we could not establish this systematically for all family firms, we
nonetheless found this information for a large fraction (68%) of our sample. This is very
clear when the CEO has the same surname as the family that is known to control the
firm. In some cases this is not so straightforward, since even with a different surname, the
CEO could still belong to the extended controlling family. We found that out of the 44
firm year observations with shareholdings in the 10 to 30 percent range, where our curve
is increasing, in 77.7% of the cases (34 observations), the firm is run by a professional
manager unrelated to the family, while the CEO is a family member in 18.2% of the cases
(8 observations), which leaves 2 firm year observations, where we could not find information.
In contrast, in the 452 firm year observations where the largest shareholder is in the range
above 30 percent, we found that the CEO is a family member in almost 56% of the cases
(252 observations), while we could identify an external CEO in only 12.4% of the cases (56
observations), which leaves us with 31.9% of the cases (144 observations), where we could
neither establish nor discard the possibility that the CEO is a family member. Thus even in
the worst case scenario, if all unknown observations run against our explanation, we would
be left with about 23% (56%) family CEOs in firms below (above) the 30 percent threshold.
Finally, we check whether there are differences in the effect of ownership concentration
on performance between firms related to coordination centers and those without such a
link. Figures 5c and 5d show an increasing relation, with differences only for very low levels
of ownership concentration. Focusing on the 15 to 85 percent range, which is where the
bulk of the observations lie, both curves are increasing with very similar slopes, except for
the 15 to 20 percent range, which is decreasing for coordination center firms and increasing
for firms without such an affiliation. Thus it seems that being related to a coordination
center, which lets multinationals and their affiliates enjoy tax advantages in Belgium, does
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not have a strong impact on the ownership performance relation.
The results for the control variables are in line with the corporate finance literature.
Size is inversely related to firm performance, long and short term debts impact performance
negatively, indicating asymmetric information related to financing via debts. Investment
in financial fixed assets variable, as well as capital expenditures have a positive effect on
firm performance. Finally, R&D expenditures have a positive effect on firm performance,
as they signal good investment opportunities.
6 Robustness
We subject our results to a number of robustness checks.
6.1 Accounting measure of performance
First, we rerun our estimations with return on assets (RoA), an accounting measures of
performance. Market-to-book value is the most frequently used dependent variable in own-
ership performance studies. It is a forward-looking market-based measure of firms’ future
performance, which assumes that markets are efficient and prices accurately reflect all
available information. An alternative is to use an accounting-based measure of perfor-
mance like Return on Assets (RoA). While market-based measures of performance can be
noisy, accounting measures are backward-looking, since they are based on historical data;
moreover they can be distorted by tax laws and accounting conventions and are subject
to managerial manipulation (see e.g. Amit and Livnat 1989, Benston 1985, Fisher and
McGowan 1983, Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988). Thus, both market and accounting-
based measures of performance have advantages and disadvantages, and they can offer
complementary views on firm performance. Due to a number of missing values, our sample
with RoA reduces to 918 firm year observations. While the correlation between market-to-
book value and RoA in our data is positive, it is not extremely large: in the whole sample,
this correlation is only 0.18. Thus, the accounting and market measures of performance
clearly do not contain the same information and one should not expect to find exactly the
same results.
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The parametric results shown in Panel A of Table 6 are similar in terms of signs, to the
ones for market-to-book value: with fixed effects, there is an insignificant positive overall
effect of ownership concentration on performance, which becomes negative insignificant for
family firms but positive and significant for non-family firms. A decrease in significance
when using RoA has also been found for the ownership performance relation, for instance
in a study of Canadian firms by King and Santor (2008).
The results of the parametric part of the semiparametric estimation are shown in Panel
B of Table 6 , and the nonparametric fixed effects estimate of the effect of the largest
shareholder on RoA is displayed in Column (b) of Figure 6. The results are qualitatively
fairly similar to our base results with market-to-book value, shown in Column (a) for ease
of comparison, especially when one restricts attention to the 15 to 85 percent range. For
the whole sample, it seems that with RoA there is a more pronounced downward turn
for very high levels of ownership than with market-to-book value. Such a difference in
shape is consistent with Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) who use a quadratic specification and
find different inflection points between RoA and market-to-book value in the ownership
performance relation in a study of Swiss family firms. Like with market-to-book value,
results with RoA are quite different between family and non-family firms. For family firms,
the effect of concentration on performance is increasing at first between 15 and about 40
percent and then the relation is decreasing, but with a bump around 60 percent, while
for non-family firms the effect is increasing until it reaches a maximum before 75 percent.
Thus, overall, and especially given the weak correlation between RoA and market-to-book
value, our results appear reasonably robust to the use of RoA as a measure of performance.
6.2 Second largest shareholder
We check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of a variable for the size of the
second largest shareholder. According to the literature the existence of a second largest
shareholder may have an effect on the control exercised by the largest one. For instance,
using an event-study, von Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler (2015) show that external block-
holding by activist shareholders matters in a sample of U.S. listed firms.
In our Belgian data, in almost half of the firm/year observations there is no declared
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second shareholder, consistent with Zwiebel’s (1995) theoretical model, in which the largest
shareholder deters other shareholders from locating in the same firm. Moreover, when
present, the second largest shareholder holds an average of only 5% shares, which is very
small compared to the average of 54% shares held by the first largest one.
Panel A of Table 7 shows that in the parametric estimations, the second largest share-
holder has no significant effect on performance, except a marginally significant effect (at
10%) in non-family firms and a positive and significant effect in family firms. Note, how-
ever, that with a linear model, in family firms, it appears that the first largest owner has
no effect, which is counterintuitive. This seems to be an artifact of the inability of the
linear model to capture the effect of the first largest owner, due to the non-linearity of
the effect, which disappears in the semiparametric results. This is confirmed in panel B of
Table 7, which shows no statistically significant effect of the second largest shareholder on
performance. Moreover, the nonparametric effect of the largest shareholder on performance
is hardly affected by the inclusion of the second largest shareholder, as shown in Column
(c) of Figure 6, which is nearly identical to our base results in Column (a) for the whole
sample and the subsamples of family and non-family firms. Thus it seems that there is no
consistant effect of the second largest shareholder on performance. This absence of effect
is likely due to the very large size of the first largest owner in Belgium, which leaves little
room for a second shareholder to influence the firm.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze levels of ownership concentration seldom considered before in
the literature and we show how large controlling shareholders affect firm value. We use
a unique detailed database on share ownership of Belgian listed firms which exhibit levels
of ownership concentration ignored in the literature. The very high levels of ownership
concentration via the practices of voting blocks and/or business groups make Belgian listed
firms a real laboratory to examine issues of ownership structure and performance. Our data
set also makes it possible to investigate differences between family and non-family firms, or
firms with or without a link to a coordination center.
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We use kernel-based local linear semiparametric pooled, random and fixed effects mod-
els to study the effect of very large controlling shareholders on firm performance. Using
semiparametric models means that we do not impose any a priori functional form on the
relation between the ownership and performance, which is important in this context, given
how controversial this issue is in the empirical literature. As a matter of comparison we
also use traditional parametric panel data models.
Our semiparametric results show important departures from linearity. In the full sample,
the effect of ownership on performance is positive until about 75 or 80 percent and slightly
concave. Many of the turning points we find in the full sample, or in the subsamples of
family and non-family firms, seem to correspond to thresholds that are meaningful in terms
of control, according to Belgian law.
The most interesting departure from linearity is in family firms, which exhibit a non-
monotonic ownership performance relation, that is first increasing until 30 percent and
then starts decreasing from 40 percent onwards. We find that this non-linearity, captured
by the nonparametric estimate, results in an insignificant coefficient in the parametric
model. Moreover our results for family-firms are consistent with an explanation based
on the risk-aversion of large family shareholders, which leads them to forego high-risk
high-return projects, resulting in lower performance at higher levels of ownership. It is
also consistent with the prediction of the Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) model,
that firms keep management inside the family when they hold large positions, resulting in
reduced performance, while they are more likely to rely on a professional CEO at lower
levels of ownership, resulting in better performance. We find evidence that suggests that
indeed, at low levels of family ownership concentration, firms rely more on external CEOs.
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Table 1: Variable Definition
Variable name Explanation Sources
Performance measures
Market-to-book value
(Tobin’s q)
Year end market capitalization to total assets Year end market capitalization
is available from Brussels Stock
Exchange.
RoA Net income to total assets From 1991 to 1996 we use
the National Bank of Belgium
”Centrale des Bilans” data and
from 1997 to 2006 we rely on
the ”Belfirst” database of Bu-
reau Van Dijk.
Ownership measures
Single shareholder Share ownership of each declared shareholder in a firm
considered individually, regardless of her/his size (this
means that there can be more than one in each firm at
each point in time).
We use several sources:
(1) annual reports of listed
firms;
(2) notifications available in
the Documentation and
Statistics Department of the
Brussels Stock Exchange; and
(3) yearly publications of the
shareholdings of Belgian listed
firms from the “Research and
Strategy Department Equity
Research” at ING bank
(previously BBL).
Largest shareholder
(without voting
blocks)
Shareholdings of the largest single shareholders for each
firm and each year.
Largest shareholder Shareholdings of the largest single shareholders for each
firm and each year, after aggregating up the shares of
all shareholders in the same business group and/or the
same voting block and treating them as if they were one
shareholder.
Second Largest share-
holder
Shareholdings of the second largest shareholder (when-
ever present, otherwise zero) for each firm and each year,
after aggregating up the shares of all shareholders in the
same business group and/or the same voting block and
treating them as if they were one shareholder.
Control variables
Size (in log) Log of total assets.
For all control variables, same
data sources as for RoA.
Long term debt Long term assets to total assets.
Short term debt Short term assets to total assets.
Financial fixed assets Investment in financial fixed assets divided by total as-
sets. The investment in financial fixed assets is equal to
the amounts invested by the firm in tied firms and firms
with which there exists a participation link to total assets.
The firms tied to another firm are: the firms that control
it, the firms that it controls, the firms with which it forms
a consortium, the other firms that, to the knowledge of
the board, are controlled by one of the firms mentioned
above. The firms with which there exists a participation
link are the firms, other than tied firms, in which the firm
or its subsidiary holds a direct or indirect participation.
Capital expenditures New investments normalized by total assets.
R&D Expenditures in research and development to total assets.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Firm/year observations)
Whole sample Family vs. Non-family Difference CC firms vs. Non-CC Difference
Family Non-family (t test) CC Non-CC (t test)
Variable N=1676 N=544 N=1132 p-value N=531 N=1145 p-value
Performance measures
Market-to-book value
(Tobin’s q)
1.1451 1.4065 1.0195 <.01 1.1201 1.1567 0.4639
(0.8809) (1.0785) (0.8058) (0.9132) (0.8756)
RoA (N=918) (N=367) (N=551) (N=293) (N=625)
0.0344 0.0417 0.0295 0.1260 0.0384 0.0325 0.4849
(0.0343) (0.0360) (0.0332) (0.0348) (0.0337)
Ownership measures
Single shareholder (re-
gardless of size)
0.1392 0.1329 0.1426 0.0403 0.1066 0.1588 <0.01
(0.0516) (0.0512) (0.0517) (0.0316) (0.0679)
Largest shareholder
(without voting blocks)
0.4334 0.4279 0.4360 0.4652 0.4050 0.4465 <.01
(0.4186) (0.3993) (0.4375) (0.3800) (0.4509)
Largest shareholder
(with voting blocks)
0.5452 0.5626 0.5369 0.0172 0.4970 0.5676 <.01
(0.5455) (0.5608) (0.5356) (0.5010) (0.5686)
Second Largest share-
holder
0.0522 0.0548 0.0510 0.3528 0.0508 0.0528 0.6334
(0.0047) (0.0294) (0.0000) (0.0260) (0.0000)
Control variables
Size (in log) 18.7117 18.7753 18.6812 0.3363 20.2708 17.9887 <.01
(18.4616) (18.4237) (18.4845) (20.5121) (17.9798)
Long term debt 0.1138 0.1062 0.1175 0.1584 0.1600 0.0925 <.01
(0.0553) (0.0658) (0.0495) (0.1278) (0.0189)
Short term debt 0.2581 0.2710 0.2520 0.0816 0.2779 0.2490 <.01
(0.2169) (0.2260) (0.2120) (0.2425) (0.1974)
Financial fixed assets 0.4777 0.4865 0.4734 0.4061 0.6200 0.4117 <.01
(0.5120) (0.5171) (0.5047) (0.6422) (0.3902)
Capital expenditures 0.0173 0.0172 0.0173 0.9713 0.0156 0.0181 0.3576
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0036) (0.0001)
R&D 0.0025 0.0028 0.0023 0.5522 0.0042 0.0017 <.01
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
This table contains means (and medians between brackets) of the variables we use, as well as t statistics of the test
of the null hypothesis that means are equal across groups. Market-to-book value (Tobin’s q) is the proxy we use for
firm value. RoA is return on assets. The number of observations for RoA is 918, 367, 551, 293, and 625 for the whole
sample, family firms, non-families, firms related to coordination centers (CC), and not related to CC, respectively.
Single shareholder is the percentage of share ownership of all declared shareholders, regardless of their size. There
can be several shareholders in the same firm and therefore the number of observations for this variable is 7575 in the
whole sample, 2650 and 4925 for family and non-family firms respectively, 2839 and 4736 for firms with and without
a link to a coordination center. Largest shareholder (without voting blocks) is the percentage of share holdings of
the largest shareholder, without aggregating votes in the same voting block. Largest shareholder (with voting blocks)
is the percentage of share holdings of the largest shareholder, after aggregation of all votes that belong to the same
voting block. Second Largest shareholder is the percentage share holdings of the second largest shareholder. Size is
the log of total assets. Long term and short term debt are divided by total assets. Financial fixed assets variable
represents investment in financial fixed assets divided by total assets. Capital expenditures variable represents new
acquisitions divided by total assets. R&D expenditures are also normalized by total assets.
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Table 3: Frequency of the number of different categories of shareholders per firm (in terms
of firm year observations)
Panel A: Largest shareholders by sector of activity
All firms Family firms Non-family firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
each of each of each of
share voting share voting share voting
Shareholder sector of activity % holder block % holder block % holder block
Panel A.1 Individual shareholders in the largest voting block
N=4300 N=1670 N=2630
Financial intermediation ex-
cept insurance and pension
funding
48.65 17.09 57.04 45.87 19.20 57.40 50.42 15.87 56.83
Physical persons 14.84 7.14 54.42 18.68 7.70 60.40 12.40 6.61 48.69
Other business activities 11.63 13.78 59.51 10.90 12.89 60.56 12.09 14.28 58.90
Insurance and pension funding,
except compulsory social secu-
rity
3.98 2.49 53.83 1.20 2.36 67.90 5.74 2.50 51.96
Real estate activities 3.93 10.90 53.28 5.69 11.91 56.29 2.81 9.61 49.41
Activities auxiliary to financial
intermediation
2.33 10.33 56.21 2.04 15.88 59.68 2.51 7.47 54.42
Remainder 14.65 15.63 14.03
Panel A.2 Largest standalone shareholders
N=130 N=31 N=97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial intermediation ex-
cept insurance and pension
funding
57.69 54.22 64.52 55.25 56.70 53.84
Physical persons 6.92 31.79 9.68 64.88 6.19 15.25
Other business activities 14.62 55.78 16.13 52.72 14.43 56.87
Real estate activities 3.85 36.67 6.45 41.45 3.09 33.49
Activities auxiliary to financial
intermediation
2.31 32.58 0 3.09 32.58
Remainder 14.62 3.23 16.49
Panel B: Different categories of shareholders per firm
(1) (2) (3)
Business Groups
Voting blocks Business Groups per voting block
N Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
0 1137 67.84 840 50.12 1425 85.02
1 500 29.83 625 37.29 137 8.17
2 33 1.97 147 8.77 68 4.06
3 6 0.36 50 2.98 35 2.09
4 - - 12 0.72 11 0.60
5 - - 2 0.12 - -
Panel A shows the main sectors of activity to which the largest shareholders belong. Panel A.1 contains a description
of shareholders forming the largest voting blocks. Columns (1), (4), and (7) show the prevalence of each type of
shareholder in terms of shareholder year observations. Columns (2), (5), and (8) show their average shareholdings,
while Columns (3), (6), and (9) show the average shareholdings of the voting block they belong to. Panel A.2 shows
shareholdings of the largest shareholders who do not belong to a voting block. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show
prevalence of each type of shareholder in terms of shareholder year observations, and Columns (2), (4), and (6) show
their average shareholdings. Panel B shows the frequencies of the number of different types of block shareholders in
firm year observations. Column (1) shows the number of voting blocks per firm/year, Column (2) shows the number
of business groups per firm/year, and Column (3) shows the number of business groups that compose voting blocks.
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Table 4: The effect of concentration on firm performance: whole sample and family firms.
Market-to-book value
Whole Sample Family firms Non-family firms
N=1676 N=544 N=1132
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE
Panel A: Parametric models
Largest shareholder -0.184* 0.332** 0.143 -0.019 -0.390 -0.403 -0.267** 0.399*** 0.247**
(0.110) (0.129) (0.121) (0.268) (0.310) (0.292) (0.118) (0.134) (0.123)
Size -0.042*** -0.375*** -0.200*** -0.043 -0.608*** -0.314*** -0.047*** -0.251*** -0.128***
(0.013) (0.032) (0.023) (0.033) (0.072) (0.054) (0.015) (0.036) (0.024)
Short term debt -0.504** -0.297*** -0.317*** -0.698*** -1.065*** -0.930*** -0.422 -0.072 -0.132
(0.230) (0.112) (0.105) (0.229) (0.280) (0.263) (0.305) (0.117) (0.108)
Long term debt -0.745*** -1.147*** -1.012*** -1.689*** -1.938*** -1.662*** -0.547*** -0.917*** -0.805***
(0.144) (0.148) (0.143) (0.340) (0.368) (0.360) (0.155) (0.154) (0.145)
Financial fixed assets 0.167* 0.185* 0.157* -0.309 -0.285 -0.312 0.360*** 0.390*** 0.382***
(0.090) (0.098) (0.093) (0.208) (0.222) (0.209) (0.089) (0.104) (0.097)
Capital expenditures 1.665** 0.643** 0.653** 5.130*** 0.286 1.193 1.264** 0.597** 0.613**
(0.664) (0.305) (0.311) (1.286) (1.178) (1.196) (0.524) (0.287) (0.287)
R&D 7.976** 5.527** 4.067** 18.640*** 17.493*** 21.642*** 5.724** 1.751 2.648*
(3.295) (2.734) (1.642) (4.413) (6.173) (5.728) (2.671) (2.819) (1.541)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.120 0.271 0.199 0.395 0.125 0.244
Panel B: Parametric part of semiparametric models
Size -0.043∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.058) (0.048) (0.02) (0.042) (0.039)
Short term debt -0.497∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗ -0.332∗∗ -0.501∗∗ -1.048∗∗∗ -0.923∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.119
(0.11) (0.121) (0.156) (0.22) (0.216) (0.29) (0.133) (0.146) (0.185)
Long term debt -0.758∗∗∗ -1.129∗∗∗ -0.912∗∗∗ -0.625∗∗∗ -1.588∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ -0.778∗∗∗ -0.873∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗
(0.15) (0.161) (0.214) (0.212) (0.233) (0.293) (0.21) (0.212) (0.289)
Financial fixed assets 0.199∗∗ 0.189∗ 0.141 0.26 0.207 0.12 0.174∗ 0.06 0.072
(0.083) (0.107) (0.134) (0.184) (0.195) (0.248) (0.098) (0.129) (0.161)
Capital expenditures 1.679∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗ 0.811 3.612∗∗ 0.149 0.423 1.48∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗ 0.858
(0.453) (0.332) (0.495) (1.549) (1.174) (1.719) (0.489) (0.351) (0.53)
R&D 7.948∗∗∗ 5.413∗ 4.53∗∗ 18.471∗∗∗ 14.075∗∗∗ 19.635∗∗∗ 3.533∗ 3.62 2.001
(1.477) (2.954) (2.125) (2.752) (5.319) (5.34) (1.814) (3.483) (2.362)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.127 0.736 0.28 0.612 0.112 0.76
This table shows results of pooled, fixed (FE), and random effects (RE) estimations of the effect of ownership
concentration on firm value. Panel A shows parametric results, while Panel B shows the parametric results for the
control variables in the local-linear kernel-based semiparametric estimations.
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by market-to-book value. Largest shareholder is the
percentage shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the firm, taking into account business groups and voting
blocks. Size is the log of total assets. Short and Long term debt, Financial fixed assets, Capital expenditures, and
R&D are all normalized by total assets. Financial fixed assets represents investment in financial fixed assets. Robust
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: The effect of concentration on firm performance: coordination center firms.
Market-to-book value
Firms affiliated to a coordination center Firms not affiliated to a coordination center
N=531 N=1145
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE
Panel A: Parametric models
Largest shareholder 0.062 0.428* 0.331 -0.236* 0.487*** 0.236
(0.225) (0.232) (0.216) (0.129) (0.162) (0.149)
Size -0.102*** -0.439*** -0.247*** -0.037* -0.308*** -0.204***
(0.026) (0.064) (0.044) (0.020) (0.037) (0.030)
Short term debt -0.571*** -0.942*** -0.946*** -0.426 -0.002 -0.067
(0.184) (0.235) (0.222) (0.285) (0.128) (0.120)
Long term debt -0.736*** -1.478*** -1.337*** -0.821*** -0.886*** -0.797***
(0.168) (0.250) (0.230) (0.234) (0.185) (0.181)
Financial fixed assets 0.163 0.265 0.136 0.128 0.057 0.073
(0.176) (0.207) (0.190) (0.101) (0.114) (0.107)
Capital expenditures 3.776* -0.230 -0.009 1.426** 0.674** 0.695**
(2.001) (1.276) (1.268) (0.604) (0.307) (0.312)
R&D 19.172*** 14.173** 18.877*** 3.826* 3.699 1.649
(4.134) (5.815) (4.629) (1.990) (3.084) (1.796)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.245 0.377 0.098 0.245
Panel B: Parametric part of semiparametric models
Size -0.042 -0.566∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.078) (0.064) (0.014) (0.039) (0.028)
Short term debt -0.638∗∗∗ -1.119∗∗∗ -0.869∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.184
(0.237) (0.298) (0.367) (0.117) (0.127) (0.158)
Long term debt -1.68∗∗∗ -1.976∗∗∗ -1.571∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.886∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗
(0.392) (0.386) (0.523) (0.149) (0.167) (0.213)
Financial fixed assets -0.313∗ -0.196 -0.261 0.403∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗
(0.186) (0.236) (0.293) (0.087) (0.112) (0.138)
Capital expenditures 5.127∗∗∗ 0.187 2.051 1.258∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.743
(1.518) (1.23) (1.806) (0.429) (0.312) (0.46)
R&D 18.511∗∗∗ 18.385∗∗∗ 20.389∗∗∗ 5.89∗∗∗ 1.595 3.462∗
(3.745) (6.431) (7.733) (1.514) (3.032) (1.955)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.229 0.539 0.14 0.788
This table shows results of pooled, fixed (FE), and random effects (RE) estimations of the effect of ownership
concentration on firm value. Panel A shows parametric results, while Panel B shows the parametric results for the
control variables in the local-linear kernel-based semiparametric estimations.
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by market-to-book value. Largest shareholder is the percentage
shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the firm, taking into account business groups and voting blocks. Size is
the log of total assets. Short and Long term debt, Financial fixed assets, Capital expenditures, and R&D are all
normalized by total assets. Financial fixed assets represents investment in financial fixed assets.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: The effect of concentration on firm performance: whole sample and family firms,
Return on Assets (RoA).
Return on Assets (RoA)
Whole Sample Family firms Non-family firms
N=918 N=367 N=551
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE
Panel A: Parametric models
Largest shareholder 0.025 0.053 0.039 0.063* -0.035 0.034 -0.006 0.078* 0.023
(0.020) (0.037) (0.024) (0.034) (0.063) (0.042) (0.025) (0.046) (0.028)
Size 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.011* 0.022*** 0.038** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004)
Short term debt -0.110*** -0.198*** -0.148*** -0.091*** -0.160*** -0.116*** -0.139*** -0.219*** -0.162***
(0.020) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) (0.047) (0.037) (0.027) (0.049) (0.035)
Long term debt -0.178*** -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.135*** -0.085 -0.094* -0.199*** -0.187*** -0.211***
(0.033) (0.038) (0.030) (0.037) (0.062) (0.051) (0.040) (0.051) (0.037)
Financial fixed assets -0.054*** -0.110*** -0.071*** -0.051** -0.024 -0.034 -0.055*** -0.162*** -0.076***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.018) (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) (0.015) (0.039) (0.023)
Capital expenditures 0.097 0.089 0.071 0.302** 0.080 0.169 0.034 0.049 0.047
(0.076) (0.153) (0.084) (0.137) (0.212) (0.194) (0.046) (0.219) (0.095)
R&D -0.506 0.026 -0.437 0.719** 0.367 0.577 -1.027** -0.220 -0.852*
(0.389) (0.541) (0.393) (0.295) (0.903) (0.670) (0.498) (0.690) (0.483)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.187 0.146 0.141 0.087 0.249 0.206
Panel B: Parametric part of semiparametric models
Size 0.019∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005)
Short term debt -0.083∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗
(0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.032) (0.044) (0.039) (0.024) (0.04) (0.031)
Long term debt -0.153∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.037) (0.032) (0.04) (0.053) (0.047) (0.032) (0.046) (0.04)
Financial fixed assets -0.048∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.153∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (0.03) (0.039) (0.036) (0.016) (0.031) (0.022)
Capital expenditures 0.071 0.042 0.053 -0.089 -0.293 -0.2 0.058 0.128 0.058
(0.081) (0.147) (0.092) (0.295) (0.273) (0.31) (0.088) (0.173) (0.099)
R&D -0.536∗ 0.06 -0.528 0.96∗∗ 0.762 0.798 -1.385∗∗∗ -0.107 -1.006∗
(0.3) (0.561) (0.437) (0.423) (0.88) (0.598) (0.419) (0.689) (0.557)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.273 0.723 0.37 0.523 0.288 0.759
This table shows results of pooled, fixed (FE), and random effects (RE) estimations of the effect of ownership
concentration on firm value. Panel A shows parametric results, while Panel B shows the parametric results for the
control variables in the local-linear kernel-based semiparametric estimations.
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by return over assets (RoA). Largest shareholder is the
percentage shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the firm, taking into account business groups and voting
blocks. Size is the log of total assets. Short and Long term debt, Financial fixed assets, Capital expenditures, and
R&D are all normalized by total assets. Financial fixed assets represents investment in financial fixed assets.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: The effect of concentration on firm performance, controlling for the effect of the
second largest shareholder: whole sample and family firms.
Market-to-book value
Whole Sample Family firms Non-family firms
N=1676 N=544 N=1132
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE Pooled FE RE
Panel A: Parametric models
Largest shareholder -0.176 0.319** 0.142 0.017 0.049 -0.053 -0.253** 0.281* 0.169
(0.116) (0.147) (0.136) (0.296) (0.369) (0.343) (0.123) (0.149) (0.136)
Second largest 0.064 -0.060 -0.009 0.177 1.205** 1.070* 0.134 -0.714* -0.519
shareholder (0.326) (0.316) (0.308) (0.611) (0.553) (0.557) (0.358) (0.393) (0.367)
Size -0.042*** -0.376*** -0.200*** -0.042 -0.588*** -0.301*** -0.046*** -0.256*** -0.130***
(0.013) (0.032) (0.023) (0.033) (0.073) (0.054) (0.015) (0.036) (0.024)
Short term debt -0.504** -0.298*** -0.317*** -0.704*** -1.031*** -0.919*** -0.421 -0.092 -0.145
(0.230) (0.112) (0.106) (0.227) (0.280) (0.263) (0.305) (0.117) (0.108)
Long term debt -0.745*** -1.148*** -1.012*** -1.681*** -1.957*** -1.678*** -0.549*** -0.931*** -0.812***
(0.144) (0.148) (0.144) (0.338) (0.367) (0.359) (0.156) (0.154) (0.145)
Financial fixed assets 0.165* 0.186* 0.157* -0.320 -0.301 -0.338 0.357*** 0.396*** 0.388***
(0.090) (0.098) (0.093) (0.207) (0.221) (0.209) (0.088) (0.104) (0.097)
Capital expenditures 1.663** 0.643** 0.653** 5.103*** 0.166 1.087 1.261** 0.595** 0.611**
(0.665) (0.305) (0.311) (1.298) (1.174) (1.193) (0.527) (0.287) (0.287)
R&D 7.963** 5.503** 4.064** 18.768*** 19.178*** 22.942*** 5.660** 1.671 2.631*
(3.298) (2.738) (1.645) (4.446) (6.197) (5.755) (2.670) (2.816) (1.543)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.120 0.271 0.200 0.401 0.125 0.246
Panel B: Parametric part of semiparametric model with linear effect of second largest shareholder
Second largest 0.024 -0.161 -0.078 -0.158 -0.267 0.156 0.193 -0.128 -0.107
shareholder (0.308) (0.359) (0.483) (0.628) (0.537) (0.757) (0.371) (0.463) (0.614)
Size -0.043∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.308∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.06) (0.049) (0.02) (0.042) (0.039)
Short term debt -0.497∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗ -0.333∗∗ -0.509∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗ -0.918∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.119
(0.11) (0.121) (0.156) (0.222) (0.217) (0.291) (0.134) (0.146) (0.185)
Long term debt -0.758∗∗∗ -1.129∗∗∗ -0.912∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -1.587∗∗∗ -1.198∗∗∗ -0.782∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗
(0.15) (0.161) (0.214) (0.212) (0.233) (0.294) (0.21) (0.212) (0.289)
Financial fixed assets 0.198∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.143 0.259 0.205 0.121 0.166∗ 0.062 0.075
(0.084) (0.107) (0.135) (0.184) (0.195) (0.248) (0.099) (0.13) (0.162)
Capital expenditures 1.678∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗ 0.81 3.572∗∗ 0.116 0.452 1.472∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗ 0.857
(0.453) (0.333) (0.495) (1.558) (1.176) (1.724) (0.489) (0.351) (0.53)
R&D 7.944∗∗∗ 5.355∗ 4.518∗∗ 18.404∗∗∗ 13.688∗∗ 19.752∗∗∗ 3.458∗ 3.614 1.995
(1.479) (2.96) (2.127) (2.767) (5.379) (5.369) (1.821) (3.487) (2.361)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.127 0.736 0.28 0.613 0.112 0.762
This table shows results of pooled, fixed (FE), and random effects (RE) estimations of the effect of ownership
concentration on firm value. Panel A shows parametric results, while Panel B shows the parametric results for the
control variables in the local-linear kernel-based semiparametric estimations.
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by market-to-book value. Largest shareholder is the
percentage shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the firm, taking into account business groups and voting
blocks. Second largest shareholder is the percentage shareholdings of the second largest shareholder (whenever
present, otherwise zero). Size is the log of total assets. Short and Long term debt, Financial fixed assets, Capital
expenditures, and R&D are all normalized by total assets. Financial fixed assets represents investment in financial
fixed assets.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Relation between managerial ownership and firm performance found in the liter-
ature.
This figure from Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, “Ownership Structure and Corporate Per-
formance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 209-233. illustrates the controversial relation
between between managerial ownership and firm performance, measured by market-to-book
value.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the number of declared shareholders in a firm
This figure shows the distribution of all single shareholders in a firm, without accounting
for their size (in terms of firm year observations).
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(a) Shareholders taken indi-
vidually (single shareholders)
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(b) Largest shareholder (with-
out considering voting blocks
and business groups)
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Figure 3: Distribution of the share ownership of the first largest shareholders
This figure shows the distribution of shareholders in various settings. The rows contain: (1) all firms, (2) family firms, (3) non-
family firms, (4) firms affiliated to a coordination center, and (5) firms not affiliated to a coordination center. The columns contain:
(a) distribution of individual declared shareholders (single shareholders), (b) distribution of largest shareholder (without taking into
account business groups and voting blocks), (c) distribution of largest shareholder (taking into account business groups and voting
blocks).
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(a) Pooled estimation
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(b) Random effects estimation
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(c) Fixed effects estimation
Figure 4: Effect of the largest shareholder on firm performance: pooled estimation, random
effects and fixed effects.
This figure shows the effect of the largest shareholder on firm performance for the whole sample with
(a) pooled estimation (b) random effects, as well as (c) fixed effects. The estimates are based on the
semiparametric local-linear kernel-based estimation, and correspond, respectively to Panel B of Columns
(1), (2) and (3) of Table 4. The solid blue line in the middle is the estimate, while the upper and lower
(dashed red) lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The figures contain vertical dotted lines at 25% and
75% of ownership, which correspond respectively to the threshold that, under certain circumstances, allows
a shareholder to benefit from a tax exemption on dividends, and to modify the statutes of the firm.
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(a) Family firms
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(b) Non-family firms
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(c) Coordination Center
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Figure 5: Effect of the largest shareholder on firm performance for various subsamples.
This figure shows the effect of the largest shareholder on firm performance for various subsamples of (a)
family and (b) non-family firms, as well as firms (c) with an affiliation to a business center, and (d) without
such an affiliation. The estimates are based on the semiparametric fixed effect panel estimation, where the
effect of ,as well as year dummies, have ben taken into account linearly. The solid blue line in the middle
is the estimate, while the upper and lower (dashed red) lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The figures
contain vertical dotted lines at 25% and 75% of ownership, which correspond respectively to the threshold
that, under certain circumstances, allows a shareholder to benefit from a tax exemption on dividends, and
to modify the statutes of the firm.
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Figure 6: Robustness checks
This figure shows various robustness checks. The rows contain results for : (1) all firms, (2) family firms, and (3)
non-family firms. The columns contain, for the fixed effect semiparametric estimations, the nonparametric effect of :
(a) the largest shareholder on market-to-book value (the base results, reproduced from Figures 4 and 5, for the sake of
comparison), (b) the largest shareholder on return on assets (RoA), and (c) the largest shareholder on market-to-book
value, when controlling for the second shareholder in the linear part of the model. The figures contain vertical dotted
lines at 25% and 75% of ownership, which correspond respectively to the threshold that, under certain circumstances,
allows a shareholder to benefit from a tax exemption on dividends, and to modify the statutes of the firm.
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Appendices
A Disclosure law requirements
The 1989 disclosure law makes notification to the Banking Commission mandatory for all
shareholding of 5 percent or multiples thereof. The notification threshold may be as low as
3 percent if the company writes this into its statutes. However, there are exceptions where
shareholdings below the 5 percent (or 3 percent) threshold lead to notification:
1. This may occur if the owners previously had an ownership of 5 percent or more, and
reduced it to below 5 percent.
2. The notification takes into account stocks and warrants. For example, if the investor
holds 1 percent in equity and 4 percent in warrants, he must notify the company.
3. When a shareholder leaves a voting pact, he/she is required to register this change.
The disclosure law applies directly to the owners of the voting rights, as well as to
those investors who control voting rights indirectly via a pyramidal structure of interme-
diate companies. Investors are required to reveal whether they are affiliated to a group of
companies or whether they act in concert with other investors.
Share ownership in Belgian listed firms can be organized in one of the three following
ways.
1. Direct stakes: holdings of independent shareholders, either moral or physical persons.
2. Group blocks: stakes of companies that are part of a business group that is subject
to consolidation rules under Belgian law.
3. Voting blocks: composed of direct stakes and/or group blocks. A voting block is a
voting coalition, where shareholders declare that they act in unison together.
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B Semiparametric panel estimation
In this Appendix, we provide further details and discussion of the semiparametric pooled,
random and fixed effect local-linear kernel-based estimation procedure that we use in the
paper. We are interested in estimating the following partially linear panel specification:
Yit = θ(Zit) +Xitβ + µi + εit, (4)
where Yit is firm performance, Zit is ownership, whose effect on performance is given by a
function θ(.), and Xit are control variables, whose effect on performance is linear. We make
different assumptions on the error term ǫit.
B.1 Random effects and pooled estimation
We first analyze the random effects case when ǫit = µi + εit and εit is assumed to be
homoscedastic with variance σ2ε , uncorrelated over time, and independent of the time-
invariant firm-specific zero mean homoscedastic random term µi, whose variance is σ
2
µ.
The variance covariance matrix for cluster i takes the form Vi = σ
2
εITi + σ
2
µeTie
′
Ti
, with
inverse V −1i = σ
−2
ε
(
ITi −
σ2µ
σ2µ+Tiσ
2
ε
eTie
′
Ti
)
and diagonal diag(V −1i ) =
(
1−
σ2µ
σ2µ+Tiσ
2
ε
)
ITi−1,
where In is the identity matrix of dimension n, and en is an n-dimensional column vector
of ones. Lin and Carroll (2000) suggest that in the case of a kernel-based nonparametric
local polynomial regression with clustered data, unlike in the parametric case, it is best to
ignore the cluster correlation. Lin and Carroll (2001) consider semiparametric regression in
the clustered case, where the variable in the nonparametric part varies only at the cluster
level, but is the same for all individuals within the cluster. The results are very different
if the nonparametric variable varies at observation level. Wang (2003) is the first to show
how to incorporate cluster correlation into the nonparametric estimation to achieve higher
efficiency. We present the estimation procedure proposed by Wang, Carroll, and Lin (2005)
for the efficient estimation of a semiparametric regression with cluster level random effects.
The objective function of the semiparametric local linear kernel random effect estimator
is a kernel-smoothed version of
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Li = −
1
2
(Yi − θi −XiβR)
′V −1i (Yi − θi −XiβR),
where, at the level of cluster i, Li is the loglikelihood, Yi = (Yi1, . . . , Yi,Ti) the dependent
variable, Xi = (Xi1, . . . ,Xi,Ti) the explanatory variables with a linear effect and associated
parameter βR, and θR = (θ1, . . . , θn) with θi = (θi1, . . . , θi,Ti) is the nonparametric function
estimate, which can be estimated using the following algorithm, given in Wang, Carroll,
and Lin (2005):
Step I: Given an initial value of βR, solve the first order condition
n∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Kh(Zit − z)G
′
it(z)V
−1
i [Yi − µ
∗] = 0, (5)
where Git(z) is a Ti by (q + 1) matrix of zeros except that for the local linear estimator,
the t-th row is git(z, h)
′ = [1, {(Zit − z)/h}
′], the s-th element of µ∗ is X ′isβR+1{s=t}{αˆ0+
αˆ1(Zit− z)/h}+1{s 6=t}θ˜R(Z, βR), where θ˜R is the current estimate of θR. With q variables
in the nonparametric part of the model, the estimation uses a product kernel Kh(v) =∏q
j=1 h
−1
j k(vh/hj), where k(.) is a univariate kernel, and h = (h1, . . . , hq) is the vector of
bandwidths. We use the Gaussian kernel, and thus the bandwidth is simply the standard
deviation of the Gaussian kernel. Given the current estimate of θ˜R, the updated estimate
is given as θˆR(z, βR) = αˆ0(z, βR).
Step II: The coefficient βR of the parametric part of the model is estimated by a profile
likelihood approach. In Step I, we computed the optimal nonparametric function θR for
any given value of βR. In Step II, we have to find the optimal βR that takes into account
both the direct effect of βR on the criterion and also its indirect effect, via θR,
∂θˆR
∂βR
. Thus,
given an estimate of ∂θˆR
∂βR
, βR can be found by solving the following optimization problem:
min
βR
n∑
i=1
(Yi − θˆR −XiβR)
′V −1i (Yi − θˆR −XiβR).
The method consists in iterating between steps I and II until convergence.
Pooled estimation can be carried out by using the random effects methodology with
Vi = σ
2
εITi .
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The variance of the estimator of the nonparametric part of the model is as follows, (see e.g.
Wang 2003):
V ar[θˆR(z)− θR(z)] =
κ
(nh1 . . . hq)
n∑
i=1
1
σ2ε
(
1−
σ2µ
σ2ε + Tiσ
2
µ
)
Ti∑
t=1
Kh(Zit − z).
B.2 Fixed effects
For the fixed effects estimation, which is generally considered the more relevant in eco-
nomics, given concerns of endogeneity, the literature is more scant than for the random
effect. Su and Ullah (2006) consider a partially linear fixed effects model based on a profile
likelihood. Li and Stengos (1996) propose a method to estimate a semiparametric panel
with endogenous regressors in an instrumental variable context. We rely on the recent
methodology of Henderson, Carroll, and Li (2008), which generalizes the Wang, Carroll,
and Lin (2005) approach to the fixed effects case. This method has been applied recently
by Zhou and Li (2011) in the context of the relation between inequality and development.
Henderson, Carroll, and Li (2008), whose presentation we follow in this subsection,
propose to estimate the nonparametric model along the lines of Wang (2003) and Lin and
Carroll (2006). The clustered nature of the data somewhat complicates the estimation,
which proceeds as follows. The fixed effect is handled by first differencing the data:
Y˜it ≡ Yit − Yi1 = θF (Zit)− θF (Zi1) + X˜
′
itβF + ǫit − ǫi1,
where X˜it ≡ Xit − Xi1. We further collect observations over time for firm i, in vec-
tor Y˜i = (Y˜i2, . . . , Y˜iTi) for the dependent variable, in vector θi = (θi,2, . . . , θi,Ti) for
the nonparametric part, and in matrix X˜i = (X˜i2, . . . , X˜iTi) for the linear regressors
and we denote vit ≡ ǫit − ǫi1. First differencing introduces structure into the (Ti − 1)-
dimensional variance covariance matrix Σi, which the estimation method takes into account:
Σi = σ
2
v(ITi−1 + eTi−1e
′
Ti−1
), and thus Σ−1i = σ
−2
v (ITi−1 − eTi−1e
′
Ti−1
/Ti). In the pure non-
parametric case (no Xits), the parameters are estimated by maximizing a kernel-weighted
version of the following criterion:
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Lit = −
1
2
(
Y˜i − θi + θi1eTi−1
)′
Σ−1i
(
Y˜i − θi + θi1eTi−1
)
,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where, in the presence of other subscripts in θ, we drop the F subscript to
ease notation. Denoting the first and second order derivatives of the likelihood Li,tθ =
∂Lit
∂θit
and Li,stθ =
∂2Lit
∂θit∂θis
, we have:
Li,1θ = −e
T
Ti−1Σ
−1
i (Y˜i − θi + θi1eTi−1),
Li,tθ = −c
′
t−1Σ
−1
i (Y˜i − θi + θi1eTi−1) for t ≥ 2, (6)
where ct−1 is a (t − 1)-dimensional column vector of zeros with 1 in the (t − 1) element.
The unknown function θF (z) is estimated by solving the first order condition:
0 =
n∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Kh(Zit − z)git(z, h)
Li,tθ
(
Yi, θˆF (Zi1), . . . , θˆF (z) + {(Zit − z)/h}
′ ∂θˆF (z)
∂z
, . . . , θˆF (ZiTi)
)
, (7)
where git(z, h) = [1, {(Zit − z)/h}
′]′ is a column vector of dimension (q + 1). Since we use
a local linear estimator, which is composed of a constant and a slope for every one of the q
variables that enters the model nonparametrically. The argument of Li,tθ is θˆ(Zi1) for s 6= t,
and αˆ0(z) + {(Zit − z)/h}
′αˆ1(z) for s = t. This forms the basis for an iterative solution,
where, given θˆ[l−1](z), the value at step l − 1, we have step l values
(
θˆ[l](z),
∂θˆ[l](z)
∂z
)
=
(αˆ0, αˆ1), where (αˆ0, αˆ1) are the solutions to
0 =
n∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
Kh(Zit − z)git(z, h)
Li,tθ
(
Yi, θˆ[l−1](z), . . . , αˆ0(z) + {(Zit − z)/h}
′ αˆ1(z), . . . , θˆ[l−1](ZiTi)
)
. (8)
Thus, we estimate θF (z), the value of the nonparametric function (the local constant), as
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well as its first derivative, ∂θF (z)
∂z
, with respect to each of the nonparametric variables. The
solutions of the kernel estimating equation above are given by (αˆ0, αˆ1) = D
−1
1 (D2 + D3),
where
D1 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
e′Ti−1Σ
−1
i eTi−1Kh(Zi1 − z)gi1g
′
i1 +
Ti∑
t=2
c′i,t−1Σ
−1
i ci,t−1Kh(Zit − z)gitg
′
it
}
D2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
e′Ti−1Σ
−1
i eTi−1Kh(Zi1 − z)gi1θˆ[l−1](zi1)
+
Ti∑
t=2
c′i,t−1Σ
−1
i ci,t−1Kh(Zit − z)gitθˆ[l−1](zit)
}
D3 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
−Kh(Zi1 − z)gi1e
′
Ti−1Σ
−1
i Hi,[l−1] +
Ti∑
t=2
Kh(Zit − z)gitc
′
i,t−1Σ
−1
i Hi,[l−1]
}
,
and where Hi,[l−1] is a (Ti − 1) column vector with elements Y˜it − (θˆ[l−1](zit)− θˆ[l−1](zi1)),
for t = 2, . . . , , Ti. The method then consists in iterating until convergence. The variance
of the iterative estimate θˆF (z) is κ/(nhΩˆ(z)), which depends on the second moment of the
kernel, κ =
∫
k2(v)dv and on
Ωˆ(z) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ti − 1
Ti
Ti∑
t=2
Kh(Zit − z)/σˆ
2
v ,
where σˆ2v is the estimated variance of the residuals
σˆ2v =
1
2n
n∑
i=1
1
Ti − 1
Ti∑
t=2
(
Yit − Yi1 −
(
θˆ(Zit)− θˆ(Zi1)
))2
.
The semiparametric aspect is handled by a profile-kernel approach, along the lines of
Wang, Carroll, and Lin (2005), and the objective function is modified to
Lit = −
1
2
(
Y˜i − X˜i
′
βF − θi + θi1eTi−1
)′
Σ−1i
(
Y˜i − X˜i
′
βF − θi + θi1eTi−1
)
,
where θˆF (z, βF ) replaces θˆF (z) in the first order condition, since now everything also de-
pends on the parametric coefficient βF . It can be shown that θˆF (z, βF ) = θˆy(z)
′− θˆx(z)
′βF ,
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where θˆy(z) is the estimator of the pure nonparametric model (without Xit), and θˆx(z) =(
θˆx,1(z), . . . , θˆx,d(z)
)′
, where θˆx,r(z) is the nonparametric estimator in the regression of the
r-th component of X on Z. The coefficient of the parametric part X, now obtains by GLS
of the residuals of Y on the residuals of X, as follows:
βˆF =
(
n∑
i=1
X˜ ′i∗Σ
−1
i X˜i∗
)−1( n∑
i=1
X˜ ′i∗Σ
−1
i Y˜i∗
)
,
where the residuals of the nonparametric regression of Y on Z are Y˜i∗ =
(
Y˜i2∗, . . . , Y˜iTi∗
)
,
with Y˜it∗ = Y˜it − (θˆy(Zit) − θˆy(Zi1)), and the residuals of the nonparametric regression of
X on Z are X˜i∗ =
(
X˜i2∗, . . . , X˜iTi∗
)
, with X˜it∗ = X˜it − (θˆx(Zit)− θˆx(Zi1)).
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